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Nuclear security programs that offer training and capacity building opportunities to practitioners working 
in nuclear facilities play a central role in strengthening the global nuclear security architecture. There is 
often a significant divide, however, between both the development of these programs and their 
implementation, and between the programs’ intended and actual outcomes. As this article will argue, this 
disconnect can often be attributed to an absence of cultural awareness and an inability for internationally-
designed programs to effectively resonate with local audiences. Accordingly, the importance of the role of 
cultural awareness in implementing nuclear security programs will be assessed, and its applications in the 
Jordanian context will be presented. 
I. Introduction and Methodology 
The successful implementation of nuclear security programs in the Middle East requires a number of 
factors to be addressed—cultural awareness, as is argued in this article, is one of the most significant of 
these factors. In order to assert that cultural awareness plays a critical role in ensuring the success of these 
programs, the concept of social sciences in international affairs will be presented. The article will then 
discuss the experience of the Middle East Scientific Institute of Security (MESIS) in implementing 
programs that lack a cultural component, and the negative impact that this may have. MESIS’s 
perspective on the importance of cultural awareness during the design of training engagements will also 
be explained.  Finally, Jordan’s development of a human reliability program will be presented as a case 
study that assesses the interplay of the various components of cultural awareness, and how an active and 
acute cultural cognizance of these components contributed to the program’s successful development. 
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The primary research design utilized in this article is qualitative in nature. More precisely, there is a 
phenomenological approach that relies on subjective observation and analysis to support the article’s 
primary objective, which is to promote the element of culture in nuclear security programs. While this 
method is useful for the purposes of this study in that it highlights personal perspective and interpretation 
of the subject matter at hand, it also presents certain limitations to achieving the primary objective. In 
particular, the development of a general theory on the role of culture would be difficult to establish based 
solely on the individual situations presented from MESIS’s perspective. Nonetheless, the article offers 
insight into how culture can influence the outcome of nuclear security programs, and the descriptive 
assessments set forth herein can be employed as a means to guide program developers and implementers 
in their design of training engagements across the Middle East. 
II. Social Sciences in International Affairs 
The role of the social sciences is becoming increasingly critical to international security. The Center for 
Empathy in International Affairs was recently established as the world’s first organization dedicated to 
promoting empathy in international affairs. Their vision is that empathy can be established as a key 
component of international policy-making and practice. 
 
The recognition of the role of social sciences in international affairs and security has been widely 
discoursed throughout the vast literature on international relations. In response to the traditional, realist, 
and behaviorist theories that dominated much of post-WWII discussions on how to best approach 
international relations, the notion of emphasizing social science components such as history and culture 
began to gain traction. In the mid-1960s, theorists began to popularize the argument that the scientific 
approach would not be able to further advance international relations theory; formal modeling, it began to 
be believed, could not contribute to a proper understanding of what was essentially an interpretive subject 
matter [1]. 
 
Furthermore, the theory of constructivism, since its initial emergence in the 1980s, has become a 
prominent school of thought on international relations and security [2]. The main tenets of constructivism, 
which state that international relations are socially constructed and shaped by values, culture, and social 
identities [3], further the perception of social sciences as an integral aspect to international affairs.  
 
No other aspect of the social sciences is as important as cultural awareness. The world saw an explosion 
of interest in sociological questions of identity following the conclusion of the Cold War, and ever since 
there has been an increasing global awareness that international relations—once considered solely a 
politico-military construct—must necessarily incorporate economic, sociological, and historical concepts 
as well [4]. Cultural awareness is itself a multifaceted concept: knowledge-based considerations of 
traditions, of histories, and of institutions within regions other than one’s own are all necessary to 
facilitate the altering of one’s psychological awareness in order to compare one’s own culture to a foreign 
one [5] This mental adjustment is required of those who seek to critically evaluate global perspectives and 
practices. The discussion of cultural awareness and competence has begun to shift toward a focus on 
cultural competency, which stresses the importance of developing programs and services that are suited 
specifically to varying cultures. The need for such programs is of paramount importance in an ever-
globalizing world [6]. 
III. The Role of Culture 
As representatives of the Middle East Scientific Institute for Security (MESIS), an Amman-based non-
governmental organization working in the field of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) 
risk reduction, we have long grappled with these concepts of regional mindfulness. The organization has 
been one of the strongest advocates for greater intercultural awareness, especially when it comes to 
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cooperative scientific endeavors that focus on capacity building. Most recently, MESIS was involved in 
the design of a series of workshops held in the United Kingdom that examined the role of cultural factors 
in nuclear security [7]. 
 
The workshops brought together a wide range of stakeholders from different nationalities and sectors in 
an informal setting that encouraged a frank exchange of views. Participants included nuclear security 
practitioners and regulators, policymakers, educational institutions, and even anthropologists. The 
workshops came away with a number of important lessons about the role of culture, including the 
following relevant points: 
 
 Cultural factors can have either a positive or negative effect on nuclear security culture; 
 Cultural factors can be national or organizational, and are major influencers of behaviors and 
norms; and  
 There tends to be a Western-centric narrative of nuclear security culture. 
 
This last point has been a particularly important issue from the perspective of MESIS and other 
representatives of non-Western countries. Throughout MESIS’s various interactions with stakeholders 
from across the region, we have witnessed a near-unanimous perception that training being offered by the 
international community on international best practices, while valuable in and of itself, was difficult to 
apply to local contexts. One participant at the UK workshop from a non-Western country made a very 
bold admission: while on the job, he would only cooperate with members of his own tribe. This would 
never, he continued, be something he would usually admit to anyone outside of his fellow countrymen, 
but he provided it as an example of how cultural practices could greatly impact proposed security 
measures. This declaration underscored the reality of how detached some of these trainings can be in their 
reluctance to change to suit individual communities. 
 
Having repeatedly received criticisms on the inability of these programs to meaningfully and sustainably 
engage the local audience, there was some feeling of vindication that a problem MESIS had identified 
years ago actually did exist. The fact that this frustration was increasingly becoming ubiquitous indicated 
the urgent need to address, and to find ways to equalize, this apparent disconnect between intention and 
outcome. In order to counter this circumstance, there is a need for establishing and promoting, as a 
community, locally derived solutions and actions 
A. Defining the Problem 
MESIS regularly works with international partners from governments or scientific institutions and their 
related contractors [8] who are implementing capacity-building activities in the Middle East. Most 
express an interest in the need to develop a better cultural awareness for the success and sustainability of 
their mission, but they often differ in the extent to which they are genuinely convinced of this. There are 
certainly plenty of grounds to understand why an implementer would not find cultural awareness to be a 
pressing priority.  To give it proper consideration requires additional effort by the implementer at a time 
when their program is already facing considerable pressures and looming deadlines. More importantly, 
implementers and the policymakers to which they report prefer more quantifiable metrics when assessing 
the success or impact of their mission; often, qualitative impacts are overlooked altogether in favor of 
quantifiable data considered more concrete.  Common metrics, therefore, are understandably more often 
straightforward measurements that can be easily taken and compared: the number of training events held 
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In addition to the challenges that are often perceived as constraints to addressing the issue of cultural 
awareness, there is an underlying problem with these kinds of engagements, namely the design phase of 
the trainings. Nuclear security engagements are purposely designed to be modular, particularly so that 
they may be replicated with a certain degree of ease across different countries or regions. While this has 
the benefit of providing program designers with certain advantages, it can sometimes prove to be 
detrimental to intended audiences. The fact that local partners such as relevant civil society organizations 
only become involved, if at all, during the delivery of the training, means that particular cultural insights 
or sensitivities perceived as integral to the success of a given program cannot at that point be effectively 
integrated. In MESIS’s experience, this has repeatedly detracted from various programs’ envisioned 
impact. 
IV. The MESIS Model 
It is critical to consider the role that local partnerships can play in improving training on nuclear security. 
By virtue of their greater cultural awareness of the local and regional contexts, local organizations can be 
important partners in the design and delivery of training [9]. 
 
This starts with the proper identification of needs, and determination of whether the training is actually 
meeting them. Training programs on offer by a variety of donors can be repetitive or duplicative and 
could even compete with each other. At times, a donor’s choice of a particular training topic could be 
determined by what the donor assesses to be the need of the recipient. In other instances, donors work 
with national authorities to determine needs more collectively, but even in collaborations such as these, 
organizations like MESIS may hold unbiased insights and may be able to best articulate certain needs on 
behalf of the recipient authorities. It would be a great benefit to the implementers, then, to open 
communication with local, neutral facilities in order to incorporate the insights from these groups into the 
design of individualized programs. There are always legitimate concerns that training providers are 
looking to collect information about the security architecture of a given country when they attempt to 
support needs assessment processes. This has been a major reason why needs assessment processes have 
not succeeded in regions like the Middle East, due to the local perception of these processes serving as 
information-gathering sessions. 
 
The design of training engagements is also an area where local organizations can play a critical role. For 
instance, while many training providers coming to Jordan prefer typical classroom setting training, 
MESIS prefers and encourages more simulation-based training. Given the high amount and regularity of 
training that experts in Jordan are undergoing, it has become difficult to keep interest levels high, or to 
ascertain the level of knowledge retention. Accordingly, MESIS is a big believer in, and promoter of, the 
“gamification” concept, which suggests that game dynamics are a much more effective way of engaging 
audiences and can be used as a new educational tool. 
 
According to a University of Toronto research report on the gamification of education, motivation and 
engagement are considered as prerequisites that are either required for the completion of a task, or for the 
encouragement of a specific behavior. The report goes on to assert the following: “In today’s digital 
generation, gamification has become a popular tactic to encourage specific behaviors, and increase 
motivation and engagement. Though commonly found in marketing strategies, it is now being 
implemented in many educational programs as well, helping educators find the balance between 
achieving their objectives and catering to evolving student needs [10].” While this posits the potential 
efficacy of gamification in educational programs, the assertion is equally as applicable in the context of 
training programs, which often take on similar formats of traditional educational structures where training 
participants are perceived as students engaging in “adult learning.” 
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Language also plays a critical part in this regard. MESIS has worked with the World Institute for Nuclear 
Security (WINS) for several years now to develop the English version of their best practices guidelines 
into Arabic. This is not due to any shortage of Arabic language translators in Vienna where they are 
based, but rather, because they recognize the difference between translating and indigenizing materials. 
Any translator, based anywhere in the world, may be able to translate a document on nuclear security into 
Arabic word for word, but this does not necessarily mean that they understand the concepts themselves, or 
that they are able to translate them in a way that is understood by a local audience. 
A. Jordan’s Human Reliability Program: A Case Study 
Jordan’s development of a human reliability program (HRP) for employees working in its first research 
reactor provides an excellent case study of how an increased cultural awareness (on national, 
organizational and international levels) has allowed for a more effective and quick completion of the 
program. The interplay of the various components of cultural awareness and their contribution to the 
success of the program’s development therefore require thorough assessment to ensure their repeated 
success and replicability in other instances. 
 
On the national level, the threat perception of a country like Jordan has been traditionally outward 
looking; surrounded by much larger and, at times, belligerent states has meant that people may not have 
given sufficient attention to the threat of insiders. On an organizational level, while management has 
certainly long recognized the seriousness of the threat, it was not organization-wide. Accordingly, when 
addressing the seriousness of the insider threat and deciding how to best highlight the issue within 
Jordanian organizations, the seriousness of the threat had to be highlighted creatively. Through the re-
development of tabletop exercises such as the Nuclear Security Insider Threat Exercise (NSITE) into 
Arabic, and through the presentation of case studies from other sectors in Jordan, and other countries such 
as the United States, the issue was able to be properly addressed. This served to generate buy-in for the 
need to develop an HRP and to emphasize that no country or critical facility or system, no matter how 
advanced, is immune to the threat of insiders. 
 
It should be noted that, culturally speaking, there are factors that limit the threat posed by insiders; for 
instance, in a collective society such as Jordan, informal familial and tribal structures are critical for 
identifying potential insiders. Likewise, because the boundaries between professional and personal lives 
of employees are more blurred in collective societies, observation of behavioral anomalies by coworkers 
or management is much more effective than that of a Western context. The awareness of these 
components was critical during the development of Jordan’s HRP, as it allowed for the portrayal of these 
issues in a culturally relevant context. 
 
In the same vein, potentially intrusive screening required of HRPs would not be very common for 
civilians and could accordingly be perceived as infringing on their privacy. This problem has been 
overcome by frank engagement with employees and an explanation that part of the bargain of working at 
such a facility meant relinquishing some personal rights to privacy in favor of greater assurances of safety 
and security. Jordan has been blessed with stability and security in an otherwise unstable region, and this 
has meant that people have traditionally had an overreliance on the security establishment. Added to that 
is the typical stove piping that tends to happen universally between security and non-security personnel in 
the nuclear sector. As such, it was critical to emphasize the shared responsibility (both for civilian and 
security agencies) to mitigate against the issue of insiders, as it is a threat that straddles both sectors.  
 
With the necessity of an HRP effectively communicated, there still existed other cultural factors particular 
to Jordan that had to be addressed.  Nepotism and family connections, for example, are commonplace in 
Jordan when it comes to employment and labor issues. Likewise, Jordan ranks high on Hofstede’s power-
distance index [11], indicating that management would be required to play a key role in setting and 
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adhering to security standards, so that others could follow suit. Finally, it has also been important to 
address organizational constraints and time pressures, especially ahead of commissioning, by considering 
models that existed elsewhere in Jordan so as to not reinvent the wheel. 
V. Conclusions 
International nuclear security programs implemented in the Middle East are indispensable tools that allow 
the countries in the region access to knowledge and practical training that might otherwise have not be 
accessible, due to constraints of capital, technology, or both. To ensure the success of any programmatic 
engagement, however, cultural awareness must continue to be recognized and promoted as a critical 
component to that success. While the notion of cultural awareness has increasingly been acknowledged as 
an integral aspect to international relations, there is a need for further promotion and understanding of its 
significance. This is especially true for nuclear security engagements, when the issue is as sensitive as 
nuclear security, and when the program is implemented in a place as complex as the Middle East. As 
Jordan’s experience with the development of its HRP has demonstrated, however, the presence of a 
credible interlocutor equipped with the necessary cultural awareness can help to overcome any of the 
perceived challenges and obstacles. 
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